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Summary: Saudi Arabia's development has advanced along three 
dimensions: economic, social and institutional. In the economic field it meant 
advances in basic infrastructure and in economic diversification. In the social 
field, the development plans emphasuzed free education to upgrade skill 
levels. The institutional dimension has seen the establishment of new 
agencies to coordinate the expansion of the country's absortive capacity. In 
spite of the benefits achieved through planned development, key issues 
remain unresolved: industriial development lacks intersectoral linkages, 
suffers from acute idle capacity, and tends to use an inappropriate kind of 
technology; Agricultural output is high cost; the labor market is distorted by 
politically-oriented government intervention; the markets for inputs and 
products are artificial depending only on availability of government oil 
reveneus; there is a growing excess supply of university graduates- relative to 
the capacity of industry to generate jobs to absorb them productively; the 
private sector continues to be overshadowed by the dominart role of the 
public sector in all economic activity; and planners have been unable to 
move closer to a consumption-production balance in both, the internal and 
the external sectors of the economy. 
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Evaluation Of Saudi Arabia's Development Planning: 
Direction And Implementation Problems 
1 - Introduction 
The objective of this work is to analyze the Saudi development planning 
experience and draw practical lessons useful for other Arabian Gulf countries 
with similar planning problems. The focus will be on the directions of planned 
development and on plan implementation problems. 
Since the 1970's Saudi Arabia adopted a system of medium term 
conprehensive planning for economic and social development. Its purpose is 
to guide development in a coordinated and balanced direction. By giving 
preference to economic activities based on the free market system, the 
private sector has been given opportunities to participate in the development 
process. 
During the fast two decades, basic physical infrastructure has been built 
and major improvements have been made in the provision of public services 
(health and education). The long term diversification of the economy was also 
taken ·into account, with sectoiral progress in Industry, Agriculture and 
Financial Services. 
2 - The Need for Development Planning 
As development proceeds through new phases, developing countries' 
economies gradually become more complex and diversified. Along with the 
increase in complexity, the need for economic planning becomes more 
important. 
Economic planing has four major goals: first, to provide long term 
directional guidance for economic activity. Usually, indicative policy 
guidelines are given to the private sector, while more formal policies are set 
for government action. Second, to provide a consistent framework for 
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coordinated sectoral development overtime. Third, to allocate public 
expenditure so as to meet government economic and social goals. And 
fourth, to strengthen the economic management capabilities of planners in 
order to give adequate direction to the economy [1, Chapter 2]. In all, 
development planning is a combination of consistent·sectoral development 
goals overtime, long term policy directions (indicative and formal), and policy 
instruments. 
The preparation of a plan requires the specification of objectives for each 
dimension of development (economic, social and institutional) and designing 
the most useful measures to achieve them [2, Chapter 15]. The effective 
contribution of a plan to development depends on the degree of consistency 
of its sectoral objectives, the success in the practical implementation of its 
policies and programs, and its long term consistent linkage with future plans 
[3, pp. 1-12]. This last point emphasizes the need for a continiued process 
of follow-up, evaluation and revision of the whole planning process of a 
country. 
3 - The Main Issues in the Development Process 
The main issues of the Saudi development process are summarized in the 
interaction of four basis trends: the expansion of the institutional functions of 
the government , the financial contribution of the oil sector to development, 
the emphasis on planned economic and social development, and the 
response of non-oil productive sectors to the opportunities offered by 
development. The interaction of the four trends has been mutually 
reinforcing: the higher the level of oil revenues, the broader the scope for 
planning and institutional growth, and the greater the opportunities for non-
oil sectors involvement in the process. The first three of those trends are 
under government control, and therefore, can be considered as planning 
instruments [4, Chapters 4-5]. 
There have been some difficulties in maintaining the momentum of such 
interaction overtime. These consist of resource disproportions and sectoral 
imbalances as development proceeded. For example, oil revenues have 
exceeded the physical spending capacity of development agencies; the 
supply of domestic resources, facilities and essential goods and services 
have lagged behind their demand; administrative inefficiencies have 
obstructed production schedules causing damaging delays throughout the 
economy. 
Another characteristic of Saudi development has been limitations in the 
ability of planners to anticipate the timing, magnitude, and direction of 
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turning points in the process of development. The acute need to synchronize 
the different growth potentials of the three controllable planning variables has 
been highlighted during turning points from contraction to expansion (and 
vice versa) of economic activity. During these changes, growth rates have 
ben adjusted to correct the underlying imbalances· in the economy. For 
instance, during the first half of the First Development Plan 1970-1975, 
Expenditure growth was reduced to correspond to the anticipated lower 
income flow. As oil revenues increased in the second half of the plan period, 
the rate of feasible economic growth was determined by the narrow base of 
domestic resources and the slow increase in the Saudi labor force. The huge 
infrastructure buildup during the Second Development Plan 1975-1980, 
aimed at maximizing absorptive capacity, would have not been possible 
without a great increase in the rate of foreign labor growth and other 
productive inputs. These increase in supply, helped in reducing domestic 
inflation rates. In contrast, the Third Development Plan 1980-1985 sougth to 
limit expatriate employment by targeting more moderate output growth rates 
and focusing on efficiency gains. 
4 - Key Structural Economic Constraints 
The key structural constraints determining the growth of the Saudi 
economy are summarized as follows: abundance of energy resources for 
export, dependence on oil exports to generate financial capital for 
development, an increasing reliance on imports for both consumer goods 
and capital eqquipment, a shortage of indigenous skilled manpower for 
development and heavy concentration of infrastructure development and 
economic management on the government. The search for solution to these 
structural constraints in turn, has generated major directions for Saudi 
development. 
5 - Major Directions Of Development 
The five-year plan of Saudi Arabia provide a long term vision and the 
conceptual framework for restructuring the country's productive resources, 
and expanding sectoral developoment. 
Over the years, the planning emphasis has shifted in responce to policy 
and budget constraints. For instance, during parts of the second and third 
plans an increase in oil revenues made it possible to expand expenditures for 
infrastructure. During these years, the objectives of planning could be largrly 
gained through government-controlled instruments, especially fiscal 
spending. However, the future pattern of growth can not be managed by only 
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relying on government expenditures, due to the cyclical behaviour of the 
world oil market and its effect on Saudi oil revenues. Private enterprise must 
be activated as a new agent for economic diversification. 
The private sector has been shifting its focus to production activities 
(industry and agriculture) that are less dependent on government 
expenditures. In· the earlier years of develpment, private enterprise was 
largely oriented toward meeting demand (through trading and distribution 
activities) stimulated by a rapidly expanding public sector. Thus, it is the 
extent and direction of private sector investment activity that will 
increassingly influnce the future shape of the economy. 
The sucessful mobilization of private sector financial assets into domestic 
investment and production, requires adjustment in the institutional relations 
betwen the government and the private sector. In response to these needs, 
the emphasis of the planning system is moving away from quantifiable 
targets for public spending and from particular initiatives by government 
agencies. Indicative guidance elements involving measures in suppport of 
the private sector are being stressed. 
The major long term strategic goals of Saudi development have been 
formulated to mitigate the effect of structural constraints, and provide a 
foundation for future development efforts. Over the past two decades, these 
strategic goals have been revised and expanded. Currently, these strategic 
goals are as follows: 
1. Developing human resources; increasing educational and technical 
training opprtunities to upgrade the productive skills of the loc::1l labor 
force. 
2. Raising living standards and improving the quality of life of a growing 
popu!ation. 
3. Developing and completing basic physical infrastructure: the second and 
third plans concentrated on building physical infrastructure, the later 
plans have emphasized maintenance of existing facilities. 
4. Economic diversification; establishing other economic sectors to diversify 
income sources and reduce dependence on oil. 
5. Strengthening the role of the private sector; in the early development 
plans the government played the leading role in stimulating economic 
activity. However, as the basic infrastructure stage of development nears 
completion, the need to engage the private sector in economic 
diversification has taken on greater emphasis. 
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6. Regional development; achieving balanced regional development by a fair 
distribution of government services and an efficient utilization of each 
region's natural resources. 
A feature of Saudi development planning is maintaining Islamic values 
over time. The , practical implication of these values for Saudi planning is its 
preference for free enterprise and social and economic justice. Government 
intervention is desirable in order to protect the weak from the injustices which 
unchecked market forces can lead to. Thus, Islamic values have been 
instrumental in fostering a mixed economy. 
Within the broad context of these major long term goals, each plan has 
had its own particular focus, reflecting the stage of development and the 
resources available to the government (Table 1). 
Table I 
Goals of the Development Plans 
Plan . 
Objective 
I II Ill IV v 
Human resource development X X X X X 
--
]ncrcasing living standards X X X X 
lnfrastmcture development X X 
Infrastmcture projects completion X X 
Infrastructure maintenance and efficient utilization X X X 
Economic diversification X X X X 
Reducing oil dependence. X X X X 
Private sector development X 
Balanced regional development X 
High rate of economic growth X X 
Mineral resource development X X 
Gee- economic/social linkages X X 
Defense and security X X X 
"!: 1970-1975,ll: 1975-1980, lll: 1980-1985, IV: 1985-1990, V: 1990-1995. 
-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC): Saudi An1bia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, United Arab Emimtes, Om:m. 
Source: see note'. 
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The first plan had a modest financial scale relative to subsiquent plans, 
but it introduced a conprehensive planning framework to undertake 
economic diversification, and the development of human resources. 
The second plan was much more ambitious than t~e previous one, given 
the availability of greater oil revenues. Infrastructure expenditures increased 
substantially, with the government providing the majority of capital 
investments. The private sector remained neglected and concentrated on 
construction, trading and distribution activities. During the plan period, key 
state organizations were created to enhance institutional coordination in 
promoting industrial development. 
The third plan concentrated on accelerating the construction of 
infrastructure, and on laying the foundations for a more diversified economy. 
Large scale public sector investments were initiated in capital intensive 
petrochemical industries to increase the local value added to crude oil. The 
private sector remained largely ineffective despite government incentives 
and funding to encourage private investments in Industry and Agriculture. 
The increased economic ·activity during the second and third plans was 
associated with a sharp increase in foreign labor, which highlighted the need 
to develop local human resources. 
As major basic infrastructure projects neared completion, the stated 
emphasis of the fourth plan was on reinforcing the diversification goal of the 
third plan. The plan intended to place great importance on the private sector 
leading the diversification drive into Industry and Agriculture. Industry, 
because of its pontential dual role as saver and earner of foreign exchange, 
was to occupy the central place in the economic diversification strategy. 
However, with the collapse in world oil markets in the mid 1980's, 
government expenditures were redirected towards expanding oil-related 
industries and human resource development. The latter became a major goal 
of the plan. Other sectors that had depended on government spending 
(Construction, Transportation, and Trade) were expected to be much less 
dynamic. 
The fifth plan, marks a new phase of development based on the progress 
achieved during the previous plans. Massive basic physical infrastructure 
projects have been largely completed, the institutional framework for 
development is in place, the process of economic diversification has been 
intiated, the foundations for private sector development have beeen laid, and 
the living standard has increased. 
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In response to this conditions, the focus of planning has shifted toward 
the following directions: placing more emphasis on the role of the private 
sector, and further developing the institutional framework for economic 
diversification. During the new planning stage, economic diversification will 
increasingly be influenced by the extent and direction of private sector 
investment. The size and distribution of government expenditures will be less 
important. Accordingly, the fifth plan emphasis on indicative planning for 
private enterprise, involves guidelines for its participation in planned total 
investment, institutional changes to facilitate the expansion of medium and 
long-term capital financing, trade policies to support the expansion of 
exports, and facilitating the identification of industrial investment 
opportunities. 
6 - Plan Implementation Experience 
6/1 First Development Plan (1970-1975)2 
The first plan was modest in size (SR 78 billion), and prepared in the 
prospect of severe financial coinstraints. But revenues began to improve 
during the second part of the plan's period, allowing for a policy of 
accilerating plan implementation. 
Government expenditure concentrated on developing public utilities, and 
on improving government manpower development services. The most 
important feature of the first plan period was the change in the degree of 
control over the country's oil resources. Foreign multinationals, which held oil 
concessions, were asked to share a greater proportion of revenue from oil 
exports with the Saudi government. 
Increased oil revenues had positive effects on increasing output in the 
non-oil economy. The nature and direction of these changes was reflected in 
the movements of the domestic labor force and in the sectoral allocation of 
foreign manpower. A decline in agricultural employment was accompanied 
by a significant employment increase in Construction, Trade, 
Transpsortation, and government services which absorbed most of the 
growth in the labor force. 
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6/2 Second Development Plant (197 5-1980)3 
During the second plan, government expenditure reached sr 684 billion, 
more than eight times larger than in the first plan (table II). It was the second 
plan which established many of the essential features of Saudi development: 
the leading role of the government and the weight of its contributiuon to 
capital formation, the importance of infrastructural development, and the 
associated role of the construction industry. One of the major features with 
long-lasting future effects was the emergence of manpower supply and 
demand porblems. Foreign labor was needed due to the acute shortage of 
.local manpower. Manpower problems became equivalent in magnitude to 
the serious issues of absorptive capacity and domestic inflation. 
Development 
category 
Economic 
resources 
Human 
resources 
Health/Social 
services 
Transport/ 
Communications 
Municipalities/ 
Housing 
Total 
Table II 
Planned and Actual Development Expenditure 
(SR billions) 
Plan 
I II Ill 
I' 1\ I' 1\ p 1\ p 
2.7 8.8 92.1 198.6 261.8 120.4 130.7 
7.4 24.0 80.1 171.8 129.6 124.3 135.3 
1.9 6.2 33.2 71.1 61.2 69.6 89.7 
7.5 24.3 40.3 86.9 143.0 139.1 76.9 
4.6 14.9 72.7 156.1 104.3 108.9 67.4 
24.1 78.2 318.4 684.5 699.9 562.3 500.0 
P: planned, A: actual. 
IV v 
1\ p 
71.4 56.5 
114.2 139.9 
59.3 63.9 
50.6 52.6 
46.0 44.8 
341.5 357.7 
Economic resources: Water, Agriculture, Petroleum. Minerals, Electricity, Industry, Construction, and 
Commerce. 
Human resources: Manpower, Training, Education, Cuhural affairs, Information services. 
Health/social services: Health, Social security, Youth wdliorc, Judicial system. 
Transport/Communications: Transport (roads, ports, airports, railroad!i), Comrnur1ications (telecommunications, 
posllll service). 
Source: see nof.c1• 
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At the time of the second plan, the country's financial strength had 
become much more favourable. While there were few financial constraints to 
development, economic growth was limited by a variety of infrastructural and 
manpower constraints. Acco'rdingly, the issues of absorptive capacity and 
domestic inflation, became dominant in the economic management of the 
country. Overall, real annual economic growth averaged 6.8%, while the non-
oil sector grew at an average annual rate of 17.6% (table Ill). 
Table Ill 
Planned and Actual Growth Rates of Real Gross 
Domestic Product by Economic Sector 
(%) 
Plun 
Sector I II Ill IV 
p A p A p A p A 
Producing sectors 13.8 7.2 9.7 21.9 15.8 O.K 8.4 1.0 
Agdcuhure 4.6 3.7 4.0 13.9 5.3 6.K 6.0 2.6 
M&ning 23.3 20.1 1~.0 0.0 9.7 U.O J.O 3.7 
Industry 14.0 9.9 14.0 26.6 I K.K 3.6 10.5 -1.8 
Electricity, Gas & 13.2 10.8 15.0 32.0 29.4 -14.8 5.0 2.0 
Wa.tcr 
Service sectors II. I 15.8 13.8 16.7 6.0 -0.6 1.4 -0.5 
Construction 10.4 25.5 15.0 13.6 -2.4 -4 .. 1 -2.K -O.K 
Trade 12.8 18.1 15.0 29.6 KA 0.0 2.5 -0.4 
Transport/ 12.9 17.8 15.0 5.3 12.9 0.5 5.0 -0.5 
Communications 
Real Estate 8.6 9.5 6.0 26.K n:• -2.3 0.0 -I. I 
Financial Services 11.0 8.4 15.0 25.9 7.2 -3.4 9.0 -I. I 
Community Services 10.0 14.9 14.0 II.K 2.9 2.7 3.5 0.0 
Government Services 11.2 9.7 12.9 IO.K 7.1 2.9 0.0 0.1 
Tolal Non-oil ~ .. 11.7 14.0 13.4 17.6 6.1 -0.3 2.9 -0.1 
sectors 
Oil sectors 9.1 10.8 9.7 -7.9 1.3 -4.K 6.3 1.5 
-
Crude oil &. Nalural 9.1 12.1 10.0 -9.7 1.3 -6.K 6.3 1.4 
Gas 
Pclrolcum refining 9.1 0.0 5.0 7.4 na J.7 nn u 
GI>P 9.8 12.2 10.2 6.K 3.2 ·I .4 4.0 0.3 
P: planned, A: aclUal, na: not avnil11ble. 
Source: xe notc1 
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v 1970-
89 
p A 
7.0 8.6 
7.0 9.1 
4.0 8.8 
1.5 8.1 
6.9 8.0 
2.7 1.5 
3.8 7.6 
3.0 11.4 
3.2 5.4 
2.8 7.1 
6.6 6.4 
1.7 1.6 
0.8 6.2. 
3.7 7.8 
2.9 0.7 
2.2 -0.1 
6.0 4.4 
3.2 4.8 
A major challenge during the plan's period was domestic inflation, which 
reached high levels midway through the implementation of the plan. 
Expenditure reduction was not the response to control inflationary pressures 
but alleviating supply shortages of non-traded goods and services. 
Shortages were important in housing, electricity, and water supply. Also, 
there were bottlenecks in trasportation and the institutions of learning. Thus, 
the high levels of market demand for non-traded goods and services were 
partially met by increased supplies and an expansion in the country's 
absorptive capacity. To protect living standards from domestic inflation, 
price subsidies for essential goods and social security benefits were 
increased. 
Over the plan timeframe, the growth of output came largely from 
producing sectors (annual growth averaged 21.9%). The concentration of 
private enterprise on Trade, Real State, Financial Services and 
Transportation activities, together with the government's emphasis on 
construction of infrastructure, contributed to the growth of service sectors. 
But these are not producing sectors like Industry and Agirculture, and could 
not become long term potential alternatives to oil. 
During the plan period, the largest contribution to investmment was made 
by the government sector, and was concentrated on infrastructure 
development (Table IV). In the absence of alternative investment 
opportunities and given the increased level of liquidity in the economy, 
considerable speculative investment was made in land and property, 
together with substantial increases in holdings of foreign assests. 
6/3 Third Development Plan (1980-1985)4 
Subsequent to strong develpment expenditure during the second plan, 
the third plan was prepared at a time when the need for consolidation was 
becoming most urgent. As a result of the high growth in non-oil sectors 
during the previous plan period, the country emerged with an increased 
absorptive capacity for converting its financial resources into real domestic 
assets. 
The third plan moved in three directions. It continued building 
infrastructure, it stressed the need for more output-oriented investment by 
the public, the Industrial and the Agricultural sectors, and it emphasized 
manpower development. Increased oil revenues in the early years of the plan 
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(1979-1980), and the subsequent sharp decline in later years, had a 
significant impact on the scale and the annual distributioon of government 
expenditures. 
Table IV 
Investment and Gross Domestic Product 
(%) 
Year 
Item 
1970 1975 1980 
Investment 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Oil 20.7 16.1 10.2 
Non-oil 79.3 83.9 89.8 
Government 41.4 52.3 62.8 
Private Non-oil 37.9 31.6 27.0 
GDP 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Oil GDP 62.3 73~5 66.3 
Non-oil GOP 37.7 26.5 33.7 
Ratios(%) 
Investment/GOP 12.8 21.3 26.8 
Investment/Oil GOP 20.5 29.0 40.4 
Investment/Non-oil GOP 33.9 80.5 79.7 
Source: see note1 
1985 1989 
100.0 100.0 
11.9 12.6 
88.1 87.4 
44.2 35.9 
43.9 5l.5 
100.0 100.0 
31.3 27.1 
68.7 72.9 
21.3 20.7 
55.6 77.3 
34.4 28.4 
During the first half of the plan period, the emphasis on infrastructural 
development coupled with developments in the oil market, pointed beyond 
the reality that was being constructed physically: they opend up the 
possibiity of continue building basic infrastructure at a faster rate than had 
been originally conceived. A sizeable influx of foreign labor was the logical 
consequence. 
The plan target growth for the non-oil economy was set at 6.1% (about 
half of that planned in each of the two previous plans), and the planned 
growth rate of the foreign labor force was 0.2%. Moderate output growth 
would thus restrict increases in foreign manpower. However, the foreign 
labor grew by over 1.1 million during the plan (or 11.7% annually), which was 
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substantially greater than planned, and raised the ratio of non-Saudi to Saudi 
workers from 1.03 to 1.49. The need for a moderate rate of growth was 
emphasized by considerations relating to world demand for crude oil, 
domestic inflation, and possible supply bottlenecks of non- traded goods 
and services. 
With the increased in oil revenues and the influx of foreign labor, domestic 
demand for non-traded goods and services rose, steimulating private 
investment in commercial and distributional activities. Also, some private 
capital with substantial financial backing from public funds, was invested in 
Industry and Agriculture. 
The second half of the plan period, was marked by the disappearance of 
the favorable conditions in the international oil market, that provided 
revenues well above anticipated levels. Thus, the stabilization in world oil 
demand caused a sudden downturn in the country's revenue position. This 
was subsequently reflected in lower levels of new government investment 
and in a decline in economic growth rates. 
During the first three development plans, the share of private sector 
investment stayed relatively constant. It accounted, on the average, for a 
third of total investment (Table IV). This fact reflected the unwillingness of 
private enterprise to play a greater role in the economy. Namely, its aversion 
towards undertaking more risky ventures in Industry and Agriculture, and 
move away from trading and distribution. 
6/4 Fourth Development Plan (1985-1990)5 
By the mid 1980's Saudi development planning entered the phase where 
it was recognized that the world market for crude oil is subjected to cyclical 
movements. Thus, to reduce the resulting uncertainty in planning 
paramaters, the government decided to expand its oil-related industries (oil 
refining and petrochemicals). The importance of the private sector and the 
market economy was also reinforced by efforts to develop Industry and 
Agriculture. 
At the time of the fourth plan preparation, it was realized that government 
revenues would be substantially less than during the third plan. As a result, 
an austere approach had to be adopted in financing development 
expenditures. Government development expenditure was set at SR 500 
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billion, which was about 11% below the actual expenditure level for the third 
plan (Table II). Nonetheless, a more vigorous private sector was expected to 
result in continuing expansion of the non-oil economy. 
Despite conservative expectations, the further we.akening of world oil 
markets in the early years of the plan, caused government revenues to fal! 
short of their Anticipated levels. Consequently, expenditures were reduced to 
31% below the plan target. This experience highlighted the importance of the 
long term goals of economic diversification and reduction of dependence on 
oil revenues. 
The shortfall in government expenditure prevented the plan's growth 
target from being achieved. Investment suffered a major decline, particularly 
in the government sector (37%). This reflected the cutback in project 
expenditures as a result of both, budgetary restrictions and the completion of 
major basic infrastructure projects. 
Despite the economic downturn, the oil refining sector (including 
petrochemicals) expanded, resulting in major export of these products to 
world markets. Underlying structural economic constraints, were revealed 
through the dynamic growth of this sector: a renewed dependence on oil 
exports to generate financial capital for development, representing a major 
setback for the goal of economic diversification. In fact, during the first three 
development plans, economic growth had remained greatly dependent on 
the high rate of total investment relative to non-oil Gross Domestic Product 
(GOP). This situation was reversed starting with the fourth plan, where the 
investment to oil GOP ratio reached 77% in 1989 (Table IV). 
6/5 Fifth Development Plan (1990-1995)6 
With the previous gains in basic infrastructure, the fifth plan points to the 
reinforcing of the initial stage of economic diversification to create new 
sources of income7• It also involves meeting manpower needs, the 
establishment of new capital markets, and opening new export markets. 
Development expenditure is set at SR 357 billioins. 
The focus of the plan, is not increasing expenditure but enhancing 
efficiency and raising the output of local labor. The plan is also greared 
towards the private sector assuming a leading role in the areas of Industry, 
Agriculture, and foreign trade. Also, increased private sector participation in 
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the ownership of public services (power generation, communications and 
transportation) will be facilitated. Despite privatization, the state will continue 
to provide basic services in defence, education, health, and additional basic 
infrastructure needs as they arise. 
The inception of the first plan took place at a time when the concept of 
planning was regarded as incompatible with a free market economy. 
However, the growth of the economy since then shows that both approches 
can work together in a mixed economy. In real terms, the economy in 1989 
(SR 47 billions) more than doubled relative to what it was in 1970, while the 
non-oil economy (SR 34 billions) has quadrupled in size. 
7 - Summary of Progress under Planned Development 
7/1 Economic growth 
Overall real economic growth has been of a declining nature overtime. 
From a remarkable 12% annuallly during the first plan, growth declined 
systematically overertime reaching only 0.3% in the fourth plan. Despite 
sharp declines in oil sector GOP in recent years, a nigher rate of growth in 
Non-oil sectors has contributed to the attainment of an average annual 
growth rate in real GOP of 4.8% over 1970-89 (Table Ill). Oil wealth has been 
used to finance imports and domestic investment for building a production 
capability. Imports increased at an average rate of 20% per year. The ratio of 
imports to GOP went from 14% in 1970 to 30% in 1989. The share of food 
imports declined from 36% to 24% over the same time frame (Table V). 
Gross domestic investment also increased, representing over 20% of GOP in 
1989 form 12% in 1970. While the share of government investment in total 
investment dropped by almost half to 36% in 1989 relative to the beginning 
of the third plan, the share of private sector investment almost doubled to 
52% during the same time period (Table IV). This adjustment in the structure 
of investment, reflects the shift of emphasis from government infrastructural 
building activity to increasing private sector involvement in production 
activities. 
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Table V 
Structure of Imports and Exports by Economy Category 
(%) 
Year 
Category 
1970 1975 1980 1985 
Imports 100.1:) 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Food 36.2 20.9 20.1 23.2 
Intermediate inputs 20.5 26.2 23.5 25.7 
Capital goods 43.3 52.9 56.4 51.1 
lmports/GDP 14.1 9.4 25.3 24.3 
Exports 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Oil 99.8 99.3 99.2 94.5 
Manufactures 0.2 0.7 0.8 5.5 
Source: see note1 
7/2 Physical infrastructure 
1989 
100.0 
24.4 
30.5 
45.1 
29.5 
100.0 
90.5 
9.5 
Development of physical infrastructure has been one of the most 
important results of Saudi planning to date. There has been substantial 
expansion in power generation, water supply, communications and transport 
(table VI). 
7/3 Agricultural development 
Agricultural development was aimed primarily at ensuring food security 
and reducing dependence on imports of basic food commodities. The 
demand for a number of farm and dairy products has been met increasingly 
by .domestic production (Table VII). As a result, there has been a decline in 
the share of food imports, and a shift towards imports of capital goods and 
inputs for Agriculture and Industry. The resulting real growth in agricultural 
output (9% annually over 1970-1989) has been achieved at a high cost. 
Namely, in the form of extensive government incentives, such as free 
distribution of land with water supplies, interest-free loans, subsidies on 
agricuitural inputs and farm machinery, suport prices for farm output, and 
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subsidized low electricity and water rates. In spite of high costs, Agriculture 
has been the fastest growing producing sector, becoming an increasingly 
important emerging activity. It accounted for 11% of real GOP in 1989 versus 
5% in 1970. 
Table VI 
Physical Infrastructure Development 
Year . 
Sector 
1970 1975 1980 1985 1989 
Electricity 
Installed generating capacity (mW) 418 I ,398 7,032 16,706 15,746 
Number of subscribers ( 1,000) 
216 352 872 1,758 2,261 
Water 
Number of desalination plants 3 5 8 12 27 
Production capacity (m. gallons) 5.1 i2.7 47.2 413.2 692.0 
Number of Dams 14 19 41 161 180 
Storage capacity (m. cu. mts.) 60.3 65.1 172.5 370.9 475.0 
Communications 
Exchange lines (m) 0.08 0.13 0.59 1.21 1,413 
Telephone lines (m) 0.03 0.09 0.32 0.-92 1.50 
Telex lines (1,000) - 0.5 8.5 16.9 14.2 
Transport 
Paved roads (1,000 km) 8.0 11.2 20.2 29.7 32.0 
Registered Vehicles (1 ,000) 59 444 I ,998 4,132 2,163 
Ports 
Number of berths - 27 101 143 163 
Handling capacity (1,000 tons) - 6,102 37,800 52,000 68,152 
"m : millions 
Source: see note1 
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7/4 Industrial development 
Industry is seen as the foundation upon which future economic 
development can be erected, even when oil resources have been depleted. 
A feature of the early Saudi industrialization is the concentration of basic 
facilities in two major petrochemical complexes (Jubail on the east coast and 
Yanbu on the West coast). Other smaller industrial cities have also been 
started. Again, similarly to the case of Agriculture, most of the non-oil related 
nascent industries are viable because of extensive government incentives. 
These include industrial sites at nominal rents with ali infrastructural services, 
low cost loans, and exemption from custom duties on machinery and 
materials. Foreign investment has been encouraged so as to promote 
technology transfer. Incentives given include unrestricted repatriation of 
profits and a 10-year tax holiday. 
The government has not favored protectionism as a policy for 
industrialization and has promoted the formation of competitive industries. 
However, protective tariffs have been granted to some industries, and the 
sector suffers from acute systematic idle capacitl leading to high-cost 
operations. 
In spite of the goal of diversification away from oil, the bulk of industry is 
concentrated on state-owned hydrocarbon-based activities. To create 
opportunities for increased private sector participation, a limited degree of 
privatization is taking place in some state enterprises. Overall, Non-oil 
industry's contribution to real GOP remains very small (4.7% in 1989 versus 
2.6% in 1970), although its real growth has been dynamic (8% for the same 
period, Table Ill). Table VII gives further information on industrial 
development. 
-24-
Table VII 
Agricultural and Industrial Development 
Year . 
Item 
1970 1975 1980 1985 1989 
Agriculture 
Output (1 ,000 tons) 
- 884 756 1,444 942 
Vegetables 307 458 470 783 809 
Fruits 213 288 266 2,191 3,718 
Cereals 156 206 349 372 479 
Milk 
Cultivated land (1,000 ha.) 7.0 40.6 129.2 748.0 854.0 
Loans granted by Saudi Arabian 
Agricultural Bank 
Amount (SR billions) 
- 0.14 1.12 2.32 na 
Number of loans 
- 16,25 i 19,782 14,746 na 
Agricultural subsidies 
- 0.07 0.58 1.47 na (SR billions) 
Industry 
Factories in operation 
number 207 479 1,401 1,817 I ,826 
capital (SR billions) 2.4 6.1 42.0 55.7 97.4 
workers (1,000) 9.0 25.2 96.1 118.5 138.3 
na : not available 
Source: see note1 
Health care and education are provided free of charge. In education, the 
average annual rate of increase in enrollments in each- level during 
1970-1989, has greatly outstripped population growth of 4.5%. The number 
of university's graduates has increased more than 17 times since 1970, while 
the increase for seGondary graduates has been more than 19 times. 
Technical education is the less developed and smallest of all education 
levels. In 1989, graduates from this level represented 1% of total graduates 
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from all levels of education, and enrollment was only 0.50% of total 
enrollments (Table VIII). Given the very fast increase in the overall numbner of 
graduates, the policy towards education should emphasize quality rather 
than quantity. 
Regarding human resource development, the crucial issue is whether or 
not private industry can create employment opportunities to meet the rapidly 
increasingly supply of university graduates. Being a small nascent sector 
which favors capital-intensive technology to reduce manpower 
requirements, it is unlikely to be in capacity to absorb a substantial number 
of graduates each year. Unless it can be demonstrated that other sectors of 
the economy will develop fast enough to provide employment opportunities 
for those graduates, their number should be reduced. A complementary 
action would be to further expand the technical centers, to absorb a greater 
number of secondary school graduates. This would increase the number of 
technical manpower for industry, which is in very short supply, and diminish 
the pressure on the higher education system. 
8 - Future Directions of Saudi develtl>pment Planning 
The main direction of future Saudi development planning will be 
focussing on measure to accelerate economic diversification. Planning has 
contributed in reducing the role of oil in the economy from 62% in 1970 to 
27% in 1989 (Table IV). 
The increasing participation of the private sector in economic activity, will 
become more vital in the future process of economic diversification. As the 
competitive environment characterizing a free market economy improves, 
the private sector must upgrade its managerial, productive and marketing 
capabilities to remain profitable. Also., the government will create 
opportunities for an increasing private sector role in areas where the former 
has traditionally taken the lead (utilities, transport and some government 
services). Encouraging the development of the banking sector, financial 
markets, and business services, will support private sector development. 
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Table VIII 
Social Development 
Sector 
1970 1975 
Education 
Number of students (1,000) 
,~lementary education 397 634 
secondary education 16 42 
higher education 7 19 
teclmical education 0.1 0.9 
Number of graduates (I ,000) 
elementary education 29.1 59.5 
secondary education 2.8 7.2 
higher education 0.8. 1.9 
technical education 0.1 0.9 
Health 
Hospitals 74 98 
Dispensaries 591 782 
Population per hospital bed 685 630 
Population per physician 5,300 2,450 
Source: see note1 
Ye;~r 
1980 1985 1989 
862 862 1,517 
93 93 79.8 
48 48 27.6 
1.6 1.6 9.2 
93.8 109.0 172.1 
15.5 30.5 55.8 
4.6 I I. I 14.2 
1.6 2.7 4.4 
109 176 247 
1,185 1,821 2,088 
530 370 282 
I ,420 800 548 
Over the last two decades, the country has been dependent on foreign 
technology. For the next state of development, the transition should be from 
purchasing technology to expanding local research and development 
capabilities. 
Another future direction in planning is the upgrading of the Saudi labor 
force skill level. Human resource development will accelerate through a 
continuing focus on education and training. The emphasis will be on 
improving technical and managerial skills, to facilitate the gradual 
replacement of non-Saudi's in those position. 
Broadening the linkages with the world economy is another future 
planning direction. Broader tradiing relations and greater foreign investment 
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in the economy provide channels for the transfer of technology, marketing 
information, and business management techniques. Closer integration with 
the world economy should be facilitated through the expansion of non-oil 
exsports. 
The major responsibility of planning is to ensure the consistency of the 
development process. This means consistency in both, the directionm of 
development (set by the strategic goals), and in the functions of 
development, whereby new programs reduce the structural weaknesses of 
the economy [14, Chapter 5]. The Saudi experience has shown that for plans 
to be consistent, they have to maintain a sound balance between the coutry's 
own resource base and its related absorptive capacity on the one hand, and 
its greater international purchasing power on the other. With the help of the 
latter, it is possible to expand the resource base (for example by importing 
foreign labor) so as to increase absorptive capacity and accelerate economic 
growth. However, a higher rate of economic growth based on extensive 
foreign labor use is only desirable when it speeds up the building of 
development infrastructure, which is the foundation for future expansion. 
When the essential infrastructure is completed, economic growth led by low 
skilled labor-intensive activities such as construction, will become less 
important. At this stage, a new emphasis is required to give priority to 
economic diversification rather than growth. Accordingly, future plans should 
emphasize the utilization of foreign labor for more human capital-intensive 
development programs. 
9 - Conclusions 
With the implementation of the fifth plan, Saudi Arabia will have 
completed 25 years of development planning. Development has been 
conceived as a concerted advance along three dimensions: economic, social 
and institutional. In the economic field it meant advances in infrastructure 
and in basic industries, as well as in Agriculture. The oil wealth has been used 
to build the infrastructure to provide the foundation for economic diversification. 
In the social field, the development plans have emphasized free education to 
upgrade skills levels. The institutional dimension has seen the creation of 
new agencies to coordinate expansion in the absorptive capacity of the 
economy. 
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In spite of the benefits achieved through planned development, key 
issues remain unresolved. Non-oil industrial development has been arbitrary, 
incipient and lacking intersectoral linkages. There is substantial idle capacity 
and a tendency to use an inappropriate kind of technol?gy. Given the factor· 
endowment of the country, industrial output growth is not limited by capital 
availability but by labor. Thus, a concentration on capital-intensive 
technology is likely to become a constraint for increased industrial output 
over the long term [15]. In addition, the disparity in the cost of local versus 
foreign manpower due to distortions in labor markets, will continue 
encouraging the hiring of foreign labor. This, in turn, limits the replacement of 
foreign workers9• As to Agriculture, the emerging Agricultural sector 
produces high cost output. The apparent prosperity of the oil boom may 
have masked those key issues. In fact, the government has been the 
paymaster of a development effort that implied little risk to the private sector. 
The government offered incentives and commitments to purchase the hidden 
costs of developing Industry and Agriculture. Much of the observed 
expansion in non-oil sectors, has been the result of heavy subsidization of 
inputs (paid for by oil revenues), and the creation of artificial markets for the 
output (i.e., bought by oil revenues). If oil revenues disappeared, it is doubtful 
that much of the observed expansion in Industry and Agriculture could 
cointinue for long [17]. 
As to education and manpower development, education should be linked 
to the needs of Industry. A greater number of secondary school graduates 
should be redirected away from the university system towards technical and 
vocational training. This will provide the needed kind of manpower to 
manufacturing. 
The role of the public sector continues to be dominant in the economy 
despite privatization initiatives. State ownership of the major source of 
revenue has meant that the state bears the responsibility for planning and 
executing development in all sectors. This, in turn, overshadows the role of 
the private sector. 
Finally, the management of the internal (non-traded goods) and external 
(traded goods) sectors of economy has been poor. Planners have been 
unable to move closer to a production-consumption balance in each 
sector10• For instance, during periods of strong government expenditure, an 
excess of consmption over production of non-oil traded goods is generated. 
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The supply shortage has been met by imports 11 . To achieve external balance, 
expenditure-switching and expenditure-reducing policies are needed. But 
Saudi planners did not implement such policies. 
An expenditure-switching policy (i.e., currency d~valuation) would have 
increased prices of traded goods (in local currency terms) relative to non-
traded goods. As higher-priced imports decreased, consumption would have 
switched to non-traded goods helping to restore external balance. In 
addition, an expenditure-reduction policy (i.e.,' lower fiscal expenditure or the 
use of taxes) would have curtailed excess consumption for traded goods. 
Both kinds of policies would have checked consumption. On the other hand, 
higher relative prices would have bidded the resources away from the 
non-traded goods sector .into the traded goods sector, to increase 
production of the latter. The decrease in consumption and the increase in 
production, would have helped in bringing about external balance. 
In the non-traded goods sector, production would have decreased, 
generating a shortage and domestic inflation. Relatively higher domestic 
prices would have partially reversed the previous resource transfer, until 
production of non-traded goods increased to meet consumption levels. The 
resources transfer would continue until internal balance was achieved. Again, 
an expenditure-reduction policy would have been required to avoid an 
exaggerated increase in domestic prices, leading to another potential round 
of external imbalances. 
NOTE 
1. Data were obtained from the following documents: [5], [6], [7], [8], [9], 
[1 0], [11], [12]. 
2. The material in this section draws on [5, Chapter 2],[6, Chapter 1 ], [7, 
Chapter 1.] 
3. The material in this section draws on [5, Chapters 1-2], [7, Chapter 1]. 
4. The material in this section draws on [7, Chapters 1-2]. 
5. The material in this section draws on [7, Chapter 2], [8, Chapter 2]. 
6. The material in this section draws on [8, pp. xv-xvi]. 
7. Producing sectors along with. Financial Services, are planned to be the 
fastest growing over 1990-1995: Industry (7.5%), Agriculture (7%), 
-30-
Electricity, Gas and Water (6.9%), Financial and Business Services 
(6.6%). However, after four development plans, foreign exchange 
generation sources remain restricted exclusively to oil exports, which 
accounted for 90% of total exports in 1989 (Table V). This heavy 
concentration of exports on a single product, would make it costly for 
Saudi Arabia to develop non-oil sectors with the potential to reduce the 
share of oil exports in total export, to let's say 50% in the long run. 
8. Idle capacity has been estimated at 47% for the whole sector, see [13]. 
9. For a comprehensive view of the effect of distortions on factor markets 
see [16, pp. 40-64]. 
10. For a detailed analysis of internal and external balance and the 
associated policies see [18, pp. 7-51], [19, pp. 168-186], [20, pp.193-
211]. 
11. As a result of the dependence on oil, and the rapid growth of 
consumption patterns unrelated to non-traded (domestic) production, 
Saudi Arabia has found itself more and more dependent on foreign 
commodity imports. In fact, the linkage between the economy and the 
world economy has grown significantly overtime. More precisely, if we 
use as the dependenmcy ratio total imports plus exports as a 
percentage of government expenditure over GOP, this rose from 50% in 
1970 to over 200% in 1987. For an additional discussion see [17]. 
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